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The ability to control external events through our own actions is a fundamental aspect of
human experience. Both the subjective experience of agency, and its neural correlates,
remain poorly understood. Previous studies show that the angular gyrus is activated when
participants explicitly judge that they lack agency. In contrast, the positive sense of agency
over external events is associated with distortions of time perception. Here, we show that
the perceived interval between actions and a subsequent tone is shorter than the perceived
interval between a physically comparable passive movement and a tone, replicating the
‘intentional binding’ effect reported previously. We considered this as a potential implicit
marker of agency, and investigated its neural basis, by using parametric analyses to
identify brain areas whose activation correlated more strongly with the perceived action-
tone interval in the action condition, than in the passive condition. Small volume correc-
tions were used to test specific hypotheses about the contribution of the angular gyrus, and
of the supplementary motor area (SMA), based on previous literature. We found no
correlation between angular gyrus and our temporal measure of sense of agency. In
contrast, we found that a lateral, caudal region within the SMA proper was more strongly
associated with the perceived action-tone interval than with perception of a control in-
terval following a passive movement. We suggest that the supplementary motor complex
contributes to the subjective experience of temporal flow that accompanies goal-directed
voluntary actions.
ª 2012 Published by Elsevier Ltd. Open access under CC BY license.1. Introduction judgements about their agency (“I did that”). Second, there is aGoal-directed action requires the ability to identify the con-
sequences of our behaviour in the external world. We use the
term ‘agency’ to refer to this fundamental aspect of human
self-consciousness (Pacherie, 2008). Recent theoretical work
distinguishes between two important aspects of agency
(Synofzik et al., 2008a, 2008b). First, people can make explicitndon, Institute of Cognit
aggard).
Open access under CC BY license.subjective feeling of control that accompanies one’s own ac-
tions, even in the absence of any conscious awareness or
reflective thought, known as sense of agency. The dominant
experimental model for studying agency involves explicit
judgements of whether a sensory event is caused by one’s
action, or by that of another agent. Several studies have used
self-recognition paradigms to investigate this explicit sense ofive Neuroscience, Department of Psychology, Alexandra House, 17
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design, the participant makes amanual action, and sees video
feedback which may either show their own action or the ac-
tion of another person. Participants judge whether they are
viewing their own hand action or not. Other studies have
extended this paradigm from recognition of one’s own hand
action to judging whether arbitrary effects, such as appear-
ance of a symbol on a computer screen, are caused by
one’s own key press actions or another person’s (Sato and
Yasuda, 2005; Wegner and Wheatley, 1999). Spatial (Daprati
et al., 2007) and temporal (Farrer et al., 2008; Wegner and
Wheatley, 1999) congruence of one’s own action and sensory
feedback are key cues for self-attributing agency. Another
prominent approach to investigate agency has been to
manipulate agency as an independent variable by either giv-
ing participants control or not giving them control over some
external event, and contrasting different levels of control
(Metcalfe and Greene, 2007). Level of control is often manip-
ulated by introducing a feedback delay.
Interestingly, recent neuroimaging studies failed to find
any clear neural correlates for positive judgements of agency,
but showed that the right angular gyrus plays a key role in
rejecting agency based on lack of temporal congruence (Farrer
et al., 2003, 2008). The importance of the parietal areas in
general, and the angular gyrus in particular, in processing of
agency was confirmed by patient studies. Lesions including
this area were reported to produce a deficit in recognising vi-
sual feedback of one’s own action (Sirigu et al., 1999). It re-
mains unclear whether angular gyrus activation is linked to
explicit judgement of agency, or whether automatic moni-
toring of actionoutcomes is sufficient. For example,Miele et al.
found an extensive activation around the right temporopar-
ietal junction (TPJ), including the angular gyrus, in a video
game task when they introduced a distortion in the relation
between participants’ movements and the resulting displace-
ment of an on-screen cursor (Miele et al., 2011) Farrer et al.
(2008) found that angular gyrus activation increased when
participants became aware of actioneeffect discrepancy, even
when theywere not required to judge agency per se. According
to the simplest model, explicit judgements of agency would
depend on a computation performed by the angular gyrus to
matchactionswith effects, but it remainsunclearwhether this
matching process is completely automatic, or requires explicit
judgement of some kind, and whether the same matching
process is also the basis of the subjective feeling of agency.
While explicit judgements of agency may be important in
social contexts where any of several individuals might be
responsible for an outcome, our everyday experiences of
agency do not generally involve explicit judgement. We can,
and frequently do, make instrumental actions where we have
a definite background feeling or buzz of being in control. In
such cases, we do have a phenomenal experience or sense of
agency, even though we did not make any explicit judgement.
We regularly experience a flow between the actions we make,
and their external effects, for example when using a computer
keyboard, driving a car or playing a guitar. Thus, we have an
implicit feeling of agency, which is non-conceptual and sub-
personal. Often, this implicit feeling of agency seems to run
in the background of consciousness. Agencymay only become
truly salient when it is lost, for examplewhen the keyboard ona computer jams, or the controls on a car fail. In the normal
flow of experience, the sense of agency seems just to be part of
what it is like to control one’s action.
The neural basis of this background feeling of agency is not
well understood. There is a general consensus that learned
spatiotemporal association between actions and effects con-
tributes to the background feeling of agency, in the same way
as it contributes to explicit agency judgements. For example,
the feeling of being in control over a car increases as we learn
how to drive it. However, there is a general difficulty in
measuring background phenomenologies of this kind. Several
studies have used perceptual attenuation of sensory conse-
quences of one’s own actions (Blakemore et al., 1998;
Chapman and Beauchamp, 2006) as an implicit measure of
agency. In addition, several distortions of time perception can
occur around the time of action. The pattern of these temporal
distortions has lead to the suggestion that they could form a
useful implicit marker of the sense of agency. For example,
distortions of time perception occur for active, but not invol-
untary movements (Haggard et al., 2002), and do not occur
when the effects of action are explicitly attributed to another
person (Desantis et al., 2011). Here we use the attraction be-
tween the perceived time of actions and their effects as a
putative marker of the subjective experience of agency. This
perceptual attraction can be considered as a subjective
consequence of the ‘constant conjunction’ of action and effect
that underlies our experience of both agency and causation
(Hume, 1763). A convenient measure of this associative aspect
of sense of agency is the “intentional binding effect”. When
people make a voluntary action to cause a sensory effect a
short time later, they estimate the interval between action
and effect as shorter relative to a control condition where the
same interval is used (Engbert et al., 2007; Buehner and
Humphreys, 2009; also Haggard et al., 2002).
While explicit judgements of agency have been extensively
investigated using functional magnetic resonance imaging
(MRI) (see above), the implicit sense of agency has been much
less investigated. Using positron emission tomography (PET),
Elsner et al. (2002) asked participants to make voluntary ac-
tions, and followed these by an auditory effect. When partic-
ipants subsequently listened to mixtures of these previously-
caused tones and other, neutral tones, a caudal region of the
SMA was increasingly active as the proportion of previously-
caused tones grew. Re-presentation of previously-caused
tones was assumed to reactivate associations between ac-
tion and effect housed in the SMA. This result is consistent
with a frontal contribution to sense of agency. However, no
measures related to agency were obtained in the critical trials
in their experiment. Miele et al. (2011) asked participants at
the end of a video game task how much control they had
experienced during that task. They found a positive correla-
tion between pre-SMA activation and explicit judgements of
“sense of control”. However, it is unclear how such synthetic
judgements relate to the underlying low-level experience
of action events and consequences remain unclear. To our
knowledge, the neural correlates of temporal association
between individual instrumental actions and their effects
have not yet been studied using neuroimaging. One trans-
cranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) study (Moore et al., 2010)
used independent estimates of time of action and effect to
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estimation approach used here. Moore et al., found that dis-
rupting the pre-supplementary motor area (pre-SMA) using
theta-burst TMS produced a decrease in intentional binding.
This result suggests that brain areas that underlie intentional
action, such as SMA and pre-SMA, are also involved in the
implicit sense of agency.
To summarise, previous brain imaging studies suggest that
parietal regions may contribute to the explicit judgement of
agency. However, existing data do not reveal whether the pa-
rietal regions, and the angular gyrus in particular, also play a
role in the subjective experience of agency. While some neu-
roimagingstudies suggest a contributionof the supplementary
motor complex to the subjective experience of agency, these
studies lack a clear perceptual measure of sense of agency. A
recent TMS study using intentional binding as an implicit
measure of agency also suggests a contribution of the sup-
plementary motor complex (Moore et al., 2010). But that study
was designed to test whether candidate areas were necessary
for intentional binding, and could not draw strong anatomical
conclusions about the precise location of the neural correlates
of implicit agency. Indeed, the repetitive stimulation protocol
used in such studiesmayhave ratherwidespread effects in the
stimulated region of cortex (Mochizuki et al., 2005), and can
also produce remote effects via neural connections with the
stimulated region (Stefan et al., 2008).
A recentmeta-analysis of studies on the neural correlates of
agency as identified in neuroimaging data has implicated the
importance of parietal brain regions such as angular gyrus, TPJ
and pre-SMA, but also found an association between agency
and activation of the insula, dorsofrontomedian cortex and
precuneus (Sperduti et al., 2011). However, this meta-analysis
did not focus on low-level implicit markers of sense of agency.
We therefore aimed to identify brain regions associated
with the implicit sense of agency, taking intentional binding
as a proxy for sense of agency.We used an interval estimation
task, in which participants judged the time between a button
press and a resulting tone. In one condition this tone was
elicited by the participant’s active button press, in another
condition the tone was elicited by a passive movement of the
same finger (cf. Engbert et al., 2007).
In order to extract brain areas associated with the inten-
tional binding effect we used a parametric approach in which
we modulated each trial with its respective judgement error.
Thus, trials with strong binding effects would have large and
negative values for this regressor, since underestimation of an
actioneeffect interval corresponds to a negative judgement
error. The parametric regressor in the passive condition of the
interval estimation task is assumed to capture all brain acti-
vation responsible for non-specific causes of variation in time
estimation, such as arousal, division of attention etc. The
parametric regressor for the active condition on the other
hand was assumed to identify both these non-specific factors,
and additionally the agency-related changes in time percep-
tion due to intentional binding. Contrasting these two para-
metrically modulated conditions e one that shows the
attraction of voluntary action and tone, and one that does
not e offers the possibility to extract brain regions that are
related to intentional binding. We used this technique to
investigate the specific contributions of the SMA and theangular gyrus to sense of agency, given that these areas were
repeatedly reported in previous studies of agency.2. Methods
2.1. Participants
Seventeen healthy students (five males; age: mean ¼ 22.4,
ranging from 19 to 28) participated on the basis of informed
consent. The study was conducted according to the Declara-
tion of Helsinki, with approval of the local ethical committee.
All subjects had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. No
subject had a history of neurological, major medical, or psy-
chiatric disorder. All participants were right-handed as
assessed by the Edinburgh handedness questionnaire
(Oldfield, 1971; mean score ¼ 92).
2.2. Behavioural task
The experimental task was similar to the one reported in
Engbert et al. (2007). It comprised an active and a passive
condition. In the active condition participants saw a green
hash on the screen and pressed a buttonwith their right index
finger at an (unspeeded) time of their own choosing. In the
passive condition, a red hash was presented on the screen.
The experimenter then pressed the participant’s finger down
onto the button, attempting tomatch the response time of the
participants as precisely as possible. Each button press elicited
the presentation of a tone after either 200, 300 or 400 msec.
Immediately after hearing the tone, participants judged the
duration of the interval between the button press and the tone
onset using a visual-analogue scale operated with two keys in
their left hand (index finger meant that the cursor moved to
the left, middle finger meant that the cursor moved to the
right and the middle finger of the right hand accepted the
position of the cursor). Participants were given as much time
as they needed for their judgement. The endpoints of the scale
were 100 and 500 msec. Prior to scanning participants were
trained to discriminate between two tones that were sepa-
rated by 100 msec and separated by 500 msec for 10 min, with
a further 10 min of identical training being given in the
scanner prior to the experimental task itself. The trials were
presented with a variable inter-trial interval ranging from
3000 to 5500 msec. The task consisted of two blocks each
containing altogether 30 active and passive trials that were
randomly presented. An equal number of trials in all six
conditions were presented within each block.
2.3. Behavioral data analysis
Repeated-measures ANOVA with the factors agent (active vs
passive) and tone delay (200, 300, 400msec) was performed on
the judgement error, namely the difference between judged
time and actual tone delay.
2.4. Scanning procedure
Images were collected with a 3 T Magnetom Trio MRI scanner
system(SiemensMedicalSystems,Erlangen,Germany)usingan
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Fig. 1 e Behavioural results of judgement error in the
interval estimation task (error bars indicate standard error
of mean).
c o r t e x 4 9 ( 2 0 1 3 ) 1 9 3 5e1 9 4 21938eight-channel radiofrequency head coil. First, high-resolution
anatomical images were acquired using a T1-weighted 3D
MPRAGE sequence (TR ¼ 2530 msec, TE ¼ 2.58 msec,
TI ¼ 1100 msec, acquisition matrix ¼ 256  256  176, sagittal
FOV¼ 220 mm, flip angle ¼ 7, voxel size ¼ .86  .86  .9 mm3).
Whole brain functional images were collected using a T2*-
weighted EPI sequence sensitive to BOLD contrast
(TR ¼ 2000 msec, TE ¼ 35 msec, image matrix ¼ 64  64,
FOV ¼ 224 mm, flip angle ¼ 80, slice thickness ¼ 3.0 mm,
distance factor ¼ 17%, voxel size 3.5  3.5  3 mm3, 30 axial
slices). Image volumes were aligned to AC-PC.
2.5. fMRI data pre-processing and general linear model
(GLM) analysis
The fMRI data were analysed with statistical parametric
mapping using SPM5 software (Wellcome Department of
Cognitive Neurology, London, UK). The first four volumes of all
EPI series were excluded from the analysis to allow the mag-
netisation to approach a dynamic equilibrium. Data process-
ing started with slice time correction and realignment of the
EPI datasets. A mean image for all EPI volumes was created, to
which individual volumes were spatially realigned by rigid
body transformations. The high-resolution structural image
was co-registered with the mean image of the EPI series.
Then the structural image was normalised to the Montreal
Neurological Institute (MNI) template, and the normalisation
parameters were applied to the EPI images to ensure an
anatomically informed normalisation. During normalisation
the anatomy image volumeswere resampled to 1 1 1mm3.
A filter of 8 mm full-width at half maximum (FWHM) was
used. Low-frequency drifts in the time domain were removed
by modelling the time series for each voxel by a set of discrete
cosine functions to which a cut-off of 128 sec was applied. The
subject-level statistical analyses were performed using a GLM.
To analyse the interval estimation task, we built a model
with six separate regressors for active 200 msec, active
300msec, active 400msec, passive 200msec, passive 300msec,
passive 400 msec. We also calculated the judgement error on
each trial, defined as the judged interval duration minus the
actual interval duration. Note that a strong intentional binding
effect therefore corresponds to a large and negative value
judgement error. We then parametrically modulated the above
six regressors by the judgement error. Movement parameters
were included to account for variance associated with head
motion.All resulting vectorswere convolvedwith the canonical
haemodynamic response function (HRF) and its temporal de-
rivative to form the main regressors in the design matrix (the
regression model). The statistical parameter estimates were
computed separately for each voxel for all columns in the
design matrix. Contrast images were constructed for each in-
dividual to compare the relevant parameter estimates for the
regressors containing the canonical HRF. Next, a group-level
random effects analysis was performed. One-sample t-test
was performed for each voxel of the contrast images. The
resulting statistical values were thresholded with a level of
significance of p < .001 (z > 3.09, uncorrected). To correct for
multiple comparisons we applied small volume correction in
the SMA and angular gyrus, based on previous neuroimaging
findings that SMA houses actioneeffect links (MNI coordinate:48 71, Elsner et al., 2002) and thatangular gyrus is involved in
explicit agency judgements (MNI coordinates: 58 46 48; 48
46 56, Farrer et al., 2008). The regions of interest (ROIs) were
created using bilateral anatomical masks created based on the
WFU Pickatlas (Maldjian et al., 2003) and the automated
anatomical labelling (AAL) atlas (Tzourio-Mazoyeretal., 2002) of
SMA, angular gyrus, insula, superior frontal medial cortex and
precuneus.
The resulting statistical maps were overlaid onto a
normalized T1-weighted MNI template (colin27) and the co-
ordinates reported correspond to the MNI coordinate system.3. Results
3.1. Behavioral results
The repeated-measures ANOVA revealed a significant main
effect for agency [F(1,17) ¼ 5.96, p < .05] with participants
giving significantly shorter interval estimates in the active
compared to the passive condition on the judgement error.
There was an unsurprising significant main effect of delay
[F(2,34) ¼ 16.49, p < .001] with more pronounced underesti-
mation of the actioneeffect interval at longer delays. There
was also a significant interaction of both factors [F(2,34)¼ 6.48,
p < .01] (Fig. 1). This interaction arose because the difference
in judgement error between active and passive conditions
increased with action-tone delay.
3.2. fMRI results
The interval estimation task was analysed by parametrically
modulating the action onset with the judgement error of the
action-tone interval. We then contrasted the active with the
passive condition based on the fact that the active condition
should involve a shortening of the awareness of the interval,
whereas the passive condition should not. This analysis
identifies brain regions that correlate with the compression of
the action-tone interval more strongly in the active than in
the passive condition. The previous literature gave strong
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experience of agency: the angular gyrus and the SMA (see
Introduction) but also insula, frontomedian cortex and pre-
cuneus. Therefore we used a small volume correction within
anatomically defined mask of these structures of interest.
We identified a significant cluster within the SMA ROI
family-wise error corrected p < .05 after small volume
correction at11,8, 74 (cluster size¼ 7 voxels) (Fig. 2). Closer
inspection confirmed that the cluster was located in left BA6,
effectively on the margin between the lateral portion of BA6
comprising the dorsal premotor cortex, and the medial
portion comprising the SMA proper. We applied a similar
small volume correction to the bilateral angular gyrus, insula,
frontomedian cortex and precuneus ROI, but found no sig-
nificant difference between the parametric regressors for the
active and passive conditions (nor in the reverse contrast)
surviving correction within these areas.
A whole brain analysis of the contrast between the para-
metric regressors for the active and passive condition with a
statistical criterion of p < .001 uncorrected for multiple com-
parisons again revealed the same SMA cluster at 11, 8, 74,
but no other significant clusters. Further, no significant clus-
ters of activation were found in the reverse contrast.4. Discussion
The present study reported neural correlates of a distortion of
time perception following voluntary action, which is taken as
a putative implicit marker of the sense of agency. The
behavioural results replicate the findings of previous reports.
We found shorter interval estimations in an active condition
in which the participant caused the tone through their action,
compared to a passive control condition (cf. Engbert et al.,
2007; Wenke and Haggard, 2009). Ebert and Wegner (2010)
recently showed that both implicit binding effects and
explicit agency judgements show a similar sensitivity toFig. 2 e Brain area of the interval estimation contrast active con
with the judgement error that reflects the subjective shorteningtemporal delays. This suggests that our measure, though
clearly implicit, does capture a core aspect of the phenome-
nology of agency.
We focussed on changes in time perception that accom-
pany the sense of agency by using parametric analyses and a
contrastive design. This analysis was designed to focus on the
associative core of the implicit sense of agency, i.e., changes in
perceived timing due to the ‘constant conjunction’ of motor
and sensory events (Hume, 1763). Thus we parametrically
modulated the BOLD responsewith the judgement error of the
perceived interval between action and tone in the active
condition, and then subtracted the similarly calculated para-
metric regressor in the passive condition. This procedure
removes variations in time estimation due to non-specific
causes, leaving only activations related to agency-related
variability in time perception. That is, the contrast between
the two parametric analyses is assumed to capture the vari-
ation in temporal experience that is specifically associated
with the context in which the participant’s voluntary action
caused the tone.
Our results highlight the involvement of SMA proper in
agency-related intentional binding.We had a prior hypothesis
that the posterior frontomedian cortex might underlie the
association between action and effect from a previous PET
study (Elsner et al., 2002) and a TMS study (Moore et al., 2010).
However, the former study did not include a subjective mea-
sure of agency, and the latter study did not explore effects of
stimulating different subregions within the SMA complex.
Thus, our previous study may be the first aiming to find the
specific brain areas correlating with the implicit feeling of
agency. Our results showed a cluster in the left SMA proper,
extending into the dorsal premotor cortex, whose activation
correlated more strongly with judgement errors in the active
than in the passive condition.
Some care is needed in interpreting this result, since it is
based on a single neuroimaging experiment. However, the
number of participants (17) in our study is roughly comparabledition> passive condition both parametrically modulated
of the interval between action and tone.
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(De Luca et al., 2010: n ¼ 12; Farrer et al., 2008: n ¼ 15; Miele
et al., 2011: n ¼ 11; Nahab et al., 2011: n ¼ 20). Moreover, dis-
missing a positive finding on the basis of a small sample does
not follow the standard logic of statistical inference (Friston,
2012). Finally, our result can be interpreted in the light of
convergent evidence from other studies about the role of this
area. However, future studies with increased sample sizes
should be conducted to confirm the reported results.
The SMAandpre-SMAhave long been ascribed a crucial role
in voluntary self-initiated action. Therefore, activation of the
left SMAwhenmaking voluntary movements of the right hand
is expected. Our results further show a correlation between
activity in the left SMAand the subjective experience of binding
between right hand actions and a subsequent tone. Other re-
sults are consistent with the SMA complex contributing to the
experience of voluntary action, and not only to generation of
voluntary action. For example, stimulation in theSMA/pre-SMA
caused a feeling of “urge” to move a specific body part in
neurosurgical patients, in absence of any detectable physical
movement (Fried et al., 1991). More recent data suggest impor-
tant distinctions between SMA and pre-SMA. The pre-SMA has
been associated with the cognitive aspects of tasks and has
been considered as a region of the prefrontal cortex (Picard and
Strick, 2001). The SMA proper is thought to be more closely
related to immediate action execution, and the pre-SMA to
planning and initiation of actions, especially complex action
sequences. Neurosurgical recordings from single units in
humans suggest that activity in theSMAproper correlatesmore
strongly with the experience of conscious intention immedi-
ately prior to voluntary action thandoes activity in the pre-SMA
(Fried et al., 2011). In our study, the cluster activated in relation
to the intentionalbindingeffectwas in theSMAproper territory,
and was clearly caudal to the pre-SMA. These considerations
suggest that the neural circuits responsible for intentional
binding may be more closely related to immediate execution
voluntary action than to the planning and initiation of action.
The peak of the intentional binding cluster identified by
our study was classified as being in the left SMA proper ac-
cording to a standard automatic labelling technique (Tzourio-
Mazoyer et al., 2002), but it was clearly more lateral and more
posterior than the medial wall pre-SMA activations seen in
some other studies of voluntary action and conscious inten-
tion (Lau et al., 2004). In fact, our cluster extended laterally
into an area traditionally classified as dorsal premotor cortex.
A widely-accepted view of Brodmann area 6 is based on a
medio-lateral gradient, withmedial portions being involved in
internally-generated actions, and more lateral portions being
involved in externally-triggered actions (Goldberg, 1985;
Passingham et al., 2010; Krieghoff et al., 2011; Brass and
Haggard, 2008).
The location of the neural substrate of intentional binding
at the junction of areas for internal and external control of
action may reflect the fact that our binding involves linking
representations of intentional action to their external effects.
Lesions in dorsal premotor cortex close to the cluster activated
in our study have been associated with the denial of motor
impairment in hemiplegic patients. These patients report that
they perform intended actions, even though they are para-
lysed and unable to move (Berti et al., 2005). This anosognosiawas interpreted as showing that normal awareness of action
is driven partly by both intentional signals, and bymonitoring
reafferent signals generated during actual movement. Dorsal
premotor lesions appeared to impair the integration of actual
reafferent information, leaving the patient with an experience
of agency that relied only on their intentions, without any
feedback from the affected limb’s lack of movement. One
might therefore interpret the dorsal premotor cortex as
binding the sensory effects of action with the intentional ac-
tion that caused them. This interpretation is also consistent
with our data: stronger activation of this area was associated
with stronger binding between action and effect.
Moreover, our activation was found in the left hemisphere,
in a task where participants responded with their right hand.
Intentional binding may depend on both predictive pro-
cesses (e.g., motor command signals, Blakemore et al., 2002;
Wolpert and Ghahramani, 2000) and on post-hoc reconstruc-
tion (Dennett and Kinsbourne, 1992; Wegner, 2002). The pre-
diction account suggests that compression of perceived time
occurs because neural preparation for action already triggers
anticipation of the effects of action. In contrast, reconstructive
accounts suggest that the mind infers and constructs a
narrative in order to explain bodily movements or their
external consequences after the fact. Recent behavioural
studies suggest that intentional binding includes both pre-
dictive and reconstructive components (Moore and Haggard,
2008). The current design does not allow us to formally sepa-
rate the predictive and reconstructive components of sense of
agency. We speculate that the computations within BA6 that
underlie the sense of agency may recapitulate the medio-
lateral gradient for the generation of action. Predictive con-
tributions to sense of agency would rely on intentions and
motor plans, and would be housed more medially, while
reconstructive contributions to sense of agency would rely on
integration of external sensory feedback, and would be
housed more laterally. Therefore, the fact that our intentional
binding cluster effectively straddles the intermediate zone
between medial and lateral subdivisions may reflect the
combination of both predictive and reconstructive processes.
The two processes cannot be dissociated using interval esti-
mation, but could be distinguished in future studies using
estimates of action timing, and varying the probability that an
action produces a tone.
We foundnoevidence that the angular gyruswas associated
withour implicit temporalmeasuresof senseofagency.Clearly,
a null result in a single neuroimaging experiment must be
interpreted with great caution: absence of a significant activa-
tion does not imply that angular gyrus plays no role in inten-
tional binding. However, the lack of activation, even when
applying small volume correction within the angular gyrus,
may be surprising for several reasons. First, the angular gyrus
was previously shown to be sensitive to delays in visual feed-
back of actions (Miele et al., 2011), and has been associatedwith
explicit judgements of lack of agency. In particular, angular
gyrus was also more strongly activated when participants
judged that they were not responsible for visual feedback,
relative to when they judged that they were responsible (Farrer
and Frith, 2002). In several studies angular gyrus has been
shown to be sensitive to delays and distortions in visual feed-
back (Farrer et al., 2003, 2008; Miele et al., 2011; Spengler et al.,
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intentional binding in our study may reflect our use of an im-
plicit measure of agency, rather than an explicit judgement
(Synofzik et al., 2008a, 2008b). We speculate that the frontal
cortex is responsible for the implicit sense of control that ac-
companies normal goal-directed actions, while the parietal
cortex is responsible for detecting deviations from expectancy
bya comparisonbetweenpredicted andactual consequencesof
action. On the other hand, neuropsychological and neurosur-
gical studies have confirmed that the parietal cortex also con-
tributes to perception of intentions, as well as explicit
judgements about action consequences (Sirigu et al., 2004;
Desmurget et al., 2009). It thus remains unclear whether the
parietal cortex contributes to the phenomenal experience of
control. However, our data suggest that the characteristic
experience of temporal flow between action and effect is fron-
tal, rather than parietal in origin.
Furthermore we neither found evidence that the insula,
frontomedian cortex or precuneus was associated with the
implicit temporal markers of sense of agency. Moreover our
results do not point to any subcortical involvement in the
experience of intentional binding. Again, extreme caution is
required in interpreting the null results from a single,
averagely-sized neuroimaging experiment. However, it is
worth noting that these areas have been strongly implicated
in previous studies of agency (Farrer et al., 2003; Farrer and
Frith, 2002; Ruby and Decety, 2001; Sperduti et al., 2011). Our
finding of a premotor correlate of intentional binding suggests
that the experience of agency may be dissociable from the
subcortical processes underlying reinforcement learning of
goal-directed actions. Sense of agency and reinforcement
learning are clearly both important aspects of goal-directed
action. Studies on reinforcement learning have stressed the
importance of activation in ventral striatum. This area is
involved in computations of reward and prediction error
thought to underlie reinforcement learning (O’Doherty et al.,
2003; Pagnoni et al., 2002; Pessiglione et al., 2006). Unlike
reinforcement learning, our task involves no overt reward.
Also unlike reinforcement learning, it emphasises subjective
experience of action, in addition to action performance. These
features may explain our finding that intentional binding in-
volves cortical not subcortical brain regions.
To summarize, we have identified the neural correlates of
an implicit measure of the sense of agency, namely the
perceptual attraction between actions and their conse-
quences, using fMRI. We found that activation of a lateral
subregion of the SMA proper correlated with the strength of
the ‘intentional binding’ between actions and their effects.
This area may combine a read-out from the motor areas that
control intentional action, with an integration of sensory in-
formation from areas that monitor external consequences of
action.Acknowledgement
This work was supported by BBSRC and ESRC project grants to
P.H., and by ESF ECRP grants to P.H. and M.B. S.K. is a Post-
doctoral Fellow of the Research Foundation Flanders (FWO).r e f e r e n c e s
Berti A, Bottini G, Gandola M, Pia L, Smania N, Stracciari A, et al.
Shared cortical anatomy for motor awareness and motor
control. Science, 309(5733): 488e491, 2005.
Blakemore S-J, Wolpert DM, and Frith CD. Central cancellation of
self-produced tickle sensation. Nature Neuroscience, 1(7):
635e640, 1998.
Blakemore S-J, Wolpert DM, and Frith CD. Abnormalities in the
awareness of action. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 6(6): 237e242,
2002.
Brass M and Haggard P. The what, when, whether model of
intentional action. Neuroscientist, 14(4): 319e325, 2008.
Buehner MJ and Humphreys GR. Causal binding of actions to their
effects. Psychological Science, 20(10): 1221e1228, 2009.
Chapman CE and Beauchamp E. Differential controls over tactile
detection in humans by motor commands and peripheral
reafference. Journal of Neurophysiology, 96(3): 1664e1675, 2006.
Daprati E, Wriessnegger S, and Lacquaniti F. Kinematic cues and
recognition of self-generated actions. Experimental Brain
Research, 177(1): 31e44, 2007.
De Luca C, Jantzen KJ, Comani S, Bertollo M, and Kelso JA. Striatal
activity during intentional switching depends on pattern
stability. Journal of Neuroscience, 30(9): 167e174, 2010.
Dennett DC and Kinsbourne M. Time and the observer. Behavioral
and Brain Sciences, 15: 183e247, 1992.
Desantis A, Roussel C, and Waszak F. On the influence of causal
beliefs on the feeling of agency. Consciousness and Cognition,
20(4): 1211e1220, 2011.
Desmurget M, Reilly KT, Richard N, Szathmari A, Mottolese C, and
Sirigu A. Movement intention after parietal cortex stimulation
in humans. Science, 324(5928): 811e813, 2009.
Ebert JP and Wegner DM. Time warp: Authorship shapes the
perceived timing of actions and events. Consciousness and
Cognition, 19(1): 481e489, 2010.
Elsner B, Hommel B, Mentschel C, Drzezga A, Prinz W, Conrad B,
et al. Linking actions and their perceivable consequences in
the human brain. NeuroImage, 17(1): 364e372, 2002.
Engbert K, Wohlschla¨ger A, Thomas R, and Haggard P. Agency,
subjective time and other minds. Journal of Experimental
Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 33(6): 1261e1268,
2007.
Farrer C and Frith CD. Experiencing oneself vs. another person as
being the cause of an action: The neural correlates of the
experience of agency. NeuroImage, 15(3): 596e603, 2002.
Farrer C, Franck N, Georgieff N, Frith CD, Decety J, and
Jeannerod M. Modulating the experience of agency: A positron
emission tomography study. NeuroImage, 18(2): 324e333, 2003.
Farrer C, Frey SH, Van Horn JD, Tunik E, Turk D, Inati S, et al. The
angular gyrus computes action awareness representations.
Cerebral Cortex, 18(2): 254e261, 2008.
Fried I, Katz A, McCarthy G, Sass KJ, Williamson P, Spencer SS,
et al. Functional organization of human supplementary motor
cortex studied by electrical stimulation. Journal of Neuroscience,
11(11): 3656e3666, 1991.
Fried I, Mukamel R, and Kreiman G. Internally generated
preactivation of single neurons in human medial frontal
cortex predicts volition. Neuron, 69(3): 548e562, 2011.
Friston K. Ten ironic rules for non-statistical reviewers.
NeuroImage, 61(4): 1300e1310, 2012.
Goldberg G. Supplementary motor area structure and function:
Review and hypotheses. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 8:
567e588, 1985.
Haggard P, Clark S, and Kalogeras J. Voluntary action and
conscious awareness. Nature Neuroscience, 5(4): 382e385, 2002.
Hume DA. Treatise of Human Nature. 2003 Edition. New York:
Dover, 1763.
c o r t e x 4 9 ( 2 0 1 3 ) 1 9 3 5e1 9 4 21942Krieghoff V, Waszak F, Prinz W, and Brass M. Neural and
behavioral correlates of intentional actions. Neuropsychologia,
49(5): 767e776, 2011.
Lau HC, Rogers RD, Haggard P, and Passingham RE. Attention to
intention. Science, 303(5661): 1208e1210, 2004.
Maldjian JA, Laurienti PJ, Burdette JB, and Kraft RA. An automated
method for neuroanatomic and cytoarchitectonic atlas-based
interrogation of fMRI data sets. NeuroImage, 19(3): 1233e1239,
2003.
Metcalfe J and Greene MJ. Metacognition of agency. Journal of
Experimental Psychology General, 136(2): 184e199, 2007.
Miele DB, Wager TD, Mitchell JP, and Metcalfe J. Dissociating
neural correlates of action monitoring and metacognition of
agency. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 23(11): 3620e3636,
2011.
Mochizuki H, Franca M, Huang Y-Z, and Rothwell JC. The role of
dorsal premotor area in reaction task: Comparing the “virtual
lesion” effect of paired pulse or theta burst transcranial
magnetic stimulation. Experimental Brain Research, 167(3):
414e421, 2005.
Moore JW and Haggard P. Awareness of action: Inference and
prediction. Consciousness and Cognition, 17(1): 136e144, 2008.
Moore JW, Ruge D, Wenke D, Rothwell J, and Haggard P.
Disrupting the experience of control in the human brain: Pre-
supplementary motor area contributes to the sense of agency.
Proceedings of Biological Science, 277(1693): 2503e2509, 2010.
Nahab FB, Kundu P, Gallea C, Kakareka J, Pursley R, Pohida T, et al.
The neural processes underlying self-agency. Cerebral Cortex,
21(1): 48e55, 2011.
Oldfield RC. The assessment and analysis of handedness: The
Edinburgh inventory. Neuropsychologia, 9(1): 97e113, 1971.
O’Doherty J, Dayan P, Friston K, Critchley H, and Dolan RJ.
Temporal difference models and reward-related learning in
the human brain. Neuron, 38(2): 329e337, 2003.
Pacherie E. The phenomenology of action: A conceptual
framework. Cognition, 107(1): 179e217, 2008.
Pagnoni G, Zink CF, Montague PR, and Berns GS. Activity in
human ventral striatum locked to errors of reward prediction.
Nature Neuroscience, 5(2): 97e98, 2002.
Passingham RE, Bengtsson SL, and Lau HC. Medial frontal cortex:
From self-generated action to reflection on one’s own
performance. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 14(1): 16e21, 2010.
Pessiglione M, Seymour B, Flandin G, Dolan RJ, and Frith CD.
Dopamine-dependent prediction errors underpin reward-
seeking behaviour in humans. Nature, 442(7106): 1042e1045,
2006.
Picard N and Strick PL. Imaging the premotor areas. Current
Opinion in Neurobiology, 11(6): 663e672, 2001.Ruby P and Decety J. Effect of subjective perspective taking during
simulation of action: A PET investigation of agency. Nature
Neuroscience, 4(5): 546e550, 2001.
Sato A and Yasuda A. Illusion of sense of self-agency:
Discrepancy between the predicted and actual sensory
consequences of actions modulates the sense of self-agency,
but not the sense of self-ownership. Cognition, 94(3): 241e255,
2005.
Sirigu A, Daprati E, Pradat-Diehl P, Franck N, and Jeannerod M.
Perception of self-generated movement following left parietal
lesion. Brain, 122(10): 1867e1874, 1999.
SiriguA, Daprati E, Ciancia S, Giraux P, NighoghossianN, Posada A,
et al. Altered awareness of voluntary action after damage to the
parietal cortex. Nature Neuroscience, 7(1): 80e84, 2004.
Spengler S, von Cramon DY, and Brass M. Was it me or was it
you? How the sense of agency originates from ideomotor
learning revealed by fMRI. NeuroImage, 46(1): 290e298, 2009.
Sperduti M, Delaveau P, Fossati P, and Nadel J. Different brain
structures related to self- and external agency attribution: A
brief review and meta-analysis. Brain Structure and Function,
216(2): 151e157, 2011.
Stefan K, Gentner R, Zeller D, Dang S, and Classen J. Theta-burst
stimulation: Remote physiological and local behavioral after-
effects. NeuroImage, 40(1): 265e274, 2008.
Synofzik M, Vosgerau G, and Newen A. Beyond the comparator
model: A mutlifactorial two-step account of agency.
Consciousness and Cognition, 17(1): 219e239, 2008a.
Synofzik M, Vosgerau G, and Newen A. I move, therefore I am: A
new theoretical framework to investigate agency and
ownership. Consciousness and Cognition, 17(2): 411e424, 2008b.
Tsakiris M, Haggard P, Franck N, Mainy N, and Sirigu A. A specific
role for efferent information in self-recognition. Cognition,
96(3): 215e231, 2005.
Tzourio-Mazoyer N, Landeau B, Papathanassiou D, Crivello F,
Etard O, Delcroix N, et al. Automated anatomical labeling of
activations in SPM using a macroscopic anatomical
parcellation of the MNI MRI single-subject brain. NeuroImage,
15(1): 273e289, 2002.
Wegner DM. The Illusion of Conscious Will. Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press, 2002.
Wegner DM andWheatley T. Apparent mental causation. Sources
of the experience of will. American Psychologist, 54(7): 480e492,
1999.
Wenke D and Haggard P. How voluntary actions modulate time
perception. Experimental Brain Research, 196(3): 311e318, 2009.
Wolpert DM and Ghahramani Z. Computational principles of
movement neuroscience. Nature Neuroscience, 3(Suppl.
1212e7): 1212e1217, 2000.
